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et al.: Insurance Law

INSURANCE LAW
I.

COURT HOLDS INSURERS HAVE

No

GENERAL DUTY TO ADVISE

INSUREDS

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held in Trotter v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.1 that an insurance agent has
no inherent affirmative duty to advise or explain to an insured the
risks and coverages an insured should consider when purchasing insurance. Addressing this issue for the first time, the court refused to expand the duty insurers owe to insureds.
Curtis R. Trotter was the sole proprietor of an upholstery business. He had insured a truck used in his business with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Trotter and his employee,
Charles Brunson, were traveling to a customer's home when the company truck was hit by an oncoming vehicle. Brunson sustained injuries
and sued Trotter in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia.2 State Farm denied coverage based on a standard
exclusion clause in Trotter's policy, which excluded coverage for any
injury to employees of an insured arising out of his or her employment.3 Trotter claimed he was unaware of this exclusion.
In 1975 Trotter first purchased insurance from State Farm
through the insurer's agent, Kim Ledford. 4 Trotter explained the nature of his business and the manner in which the truck was used. Trotter told Ledford he wanted "full protection" on the truck.5 Ledford
wrote a commercial policy which included an exclusion for injuries to
employees acting in the scope of their employment. Ledford neither
discussed this exclusion with Trotter nor advised him that he needed
workers' compensation insurance or any other coverage. Trotter never
asked Ledford for advice concerning his insurance needs and never expressed a desire for worker's compensation insurance.
Trotter had an ongoing business relationship with Ledford from

1. 297 S.C. 465, 377 S.E.2d 343 (Ct. App.), afl'd per curiam on reh'g, 297 S.C. 465,
476, 377 S.E.2d 343, 349 (Ct. App. 1988).
2. Id. at 470, 377 S.E.2d at 346.
3. Id. at 469, 377 S.E.2d at 346.
4. Id.
5. Id. Commercial automobile insurance policies routinely exclude coverage for
work-related injuries, since they are covered by workers' compensation insurance. Id. at
469 n.1, 377 S.E.2d at 346 n.1.
6. Id. at 470, 377 S.E.2d at 346.
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1975 until the 1983 accident. During that time Trotter or his wife "periodically visited Ledford's office to pay premiums, to give notification
of a change in vehicles, to discuss insurance, or to conduct other routine business."'7 While Ledford's receptionist normally handled these
matters, Trotter twice spoke to Ledford personally. In 1981, Ledford
recommended that Trotter increase his coverage and Trotter complied.
Trotter admitted, however, that he also conducted business with other
insurance companies and agents."
Trotter sued Ledford and State Farm, alleging the following five
causes of action: (1) negligent failure to advise; (2) breach of the insurance contract; (3) negligent failure to settle; (4) negligent training of an
insurance agent; and (5) unfair trade practices.' The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the fifth cause of action,
and Trotter dismissed the second cause with prejudice. 10 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trotter on the remaining issues. State
Farm moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.
The trial court denied the motions and the court of appeals reversed."
The court later
granted a rehearing, but ultimately adhered to its origi2
nal opinion.

The most important issue considered on appeal and rehearing was
whether Ledford had a duty to advise Trotter of the exclusion and
need for workers' compensation insurance. In its initial opinion the
court of appeals held that while an insurer and its agents generally owe
no duty to advise an insured, an insurer may assume such a duty by
undertaking, either expressly or impliedly, to advise the insured.'" An
insurer "must exercise due care in giving [this] advice."' 4 The court
explained that an insured could prove an implied undertaking by
showing any one of the following:
(1) the agent received consideration beyond a mere payment of the
premium; (2) the insured made a clear request for advice; or (3) there
is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would
put an objectively reasonable insurance agent on notice that his advice is being sought and relied on.15

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

468, 377 S.E.2d at 345.
469, 377 S.E.2d at 345.
476, 481, 377 S.E.2d at 349, 352.
471, 377 S.E.2d at 347. The insured bears the burden of proving this

undertaking. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted). While the first two factors are easily understandable, it
is less clear what is required to show a course of dealing. In both of the cases cited by the
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The court held, however, that the facts of Trotter did not establish
an express or implied undertaking, and thus, that State Farm and Ledford had no duty to advise Trotter."6
On rehearing, the court distinguished two cases on which Trotter
relied. The first was Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v. Sullivan,1 in which an
insured expressly requested coverage for his elevator. After reading the
policy, he asked the agent whether the policy covered the elevator, and
the agent assured him it did. The insured discovered the elevator was
not covered after a customer was injured when the elevator fell. The
court held the insurance agent had negligently failed to procure the
insurance expressly requested by the insured. 8 Not surprisingly, the
court easily distinguished Trotter's situation, since he neither expressly
requested workers' compensation insurance nor asked about the extent
of his coverage. Furthermore, Ledford never agreed to write a policy
covering injuries to employees suffered in the scope of their
employment.' 9
The court also held that Trotter was not controlled by Giles v.
Lanford & Gibson, Inc.20 In Giles the court of appeals upheld a jury
verdict for the insured based on constructive fraud committed by
agents. It found the agents had misrepresented the policy coverage.
The court concluded that because of the agents' "superior experience,
knowledge, and means of knowledge. . . ,it was reasonable for Giles
to assume the truth of any representations they made concerning the
coverage provided by the policy ... ."" While the Trotter court indicated it would have found Ledford liable had he misrepresented the
extent of Trotter's policy coverage, it refused to extend such liability to
situations in which the agent has not made a misrepresentation or the
insured has not expressly requested the coverage.2 2
Finally, the Trotter court discussed one of its earlier decisions,
CarolinaBank & Trust Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Co. 23 In that

case the court of appeals stated, "Generally, any claim or suit by a
party to an insurance contract must be based upon the terms of the

court for this proposition, however, the insureds had exclusive relationships with their
insurers. See Nowell v. Dawn-Leavitt Agency, Inc., 127 Ariz. 48, 52, 617 P.2d 1164, 1168
(Ct. App. 1980); Northern Assurance Co. v. Stan-Ann Oil Co., 603 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1979).
16. Trotter, 297 S.C. at 472, 377 S.E.2d at 347.
17. 253 S.C. 411, 171 S.E.2d 486 (1969).
18. Id. at 421-22, 171 S.E.2d at 491.
19. See Trotter, 297 S.C. at 478, 377 S.E.2d at 350.
20. 285 S.C. 285, 328 S.E.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1985).
21. Id. at 289, 328 S.E.2d at 919.
22. See Trotter, 297 S.C. at 479, 377 S.E.2d at 351.
23. 279 S.C. 576, 310 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1983).
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policy as issued. Thus, in the absence of a contractual duty to interpret
the provisions of the contract for the insured, the insurer has no such
' 24
obligation."
On rehearing, Trotter argued that Ledford had impliedly undertaken "to advise him about his insurance coverage.12 5 The court rejected this argument, stating that Trotter's request for "full protection" did not place Ledford under a duty to advise the insured. 2 The
court also concluded that Ledford's recommendation that Trotter increase his coverage was neither an undertaking to advise nor evidence
27
of a course of dealing.
Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have held that absent some
special facts, insurers do not have a duty to advise insureds. 28 Typical
of these courts' views is the Iowa Supreme Court's statement in
Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 29 that a greater duty
arises when an "agent holds himself out as an insurance specialist, consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation
for consultation and
2 s0
advice apart from premiums paid by insured.
Trotter is consistent with earlier cases from this and other jurisdictions, since it established factors which, if proven, would give rise to
a duty to advise. If an insured can show an express or implied undertaking to advise, a course of dealing, or other similar facts, courts likely
will find the agent had a duty to advise the insured. 31 Otherwise, courts
after Trotter will refuse to expand the duty owed to insureds. A contrary holding in Trotter would have placed serious burdens on agents,
forcing them to explain every standard clause and exclusion and to anticipate every need an insured might have before writing a policy.
Kenneth Lawton Frederick

24. Id. at 579, 310 S.E.2d at 165 (citation omitted). The court found, however, that
the insurance agent had voluntarily assumed the duty of advising the bank. Id.
25. See Trotter, 297 S.C. at 480, 377 S.E.2d at 351.
26. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 352 (citing Etheridge v. Associated Muts., Inc., 160 Ga. App.
687, 288 S.E.2d 58 (1981)).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Gust K. Newburg Constr. Co. v. E.H. Crump & Co., 818 F.2d 1363
(7th Cir. 1987); Stokes v. Harrell, 289 Ark. 179, 711 S.W.2d 755 (1986); Nowell v. DawnLeavitt Agency, Inc., 128 Ariz. 48, 617 P.2d 1164 (Ct. App. 1980).
29. 343 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1984). Sandbulte is typical in that it required some additional fact besides a mere insurance policy before finding a duty to advise.
30. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
31. Trotter used expert witness testimony in his attempt to establish a duty to
advise. The court stated, however, that the "opinion testimony could not create a duty to
advise which does not exist at law." Trotter, 297 S.C. at 480, 377 S.E.2d at 351.
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II. INSURANCE POLICY REFORMED FOR INSURER'S FAILURE TO DIRECT
INSURED'S ATTENTION TO CRITICAL INFORMATION REGARDING OPTIONAL
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

In Dewart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.32 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals attempted to clarify the obligations of
automobile insurers under South Carolina Code section 38-77-160. 33
This section provides that "[automobile insurance] carriers shall...
offer, at the option of the insured, underinsured motorist coverage up
to the limits of the insured liability coverage .... ,34 Although the
South Carolina Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wannamaker35 adopted a four-part test36 to determine
whether an insurer has complied with its statutory duty to offer optional coverage, the court failed to state either how the written offer in
Wannamaker failed to satisfy the test or how a written offer might
satisfy the test in the future. "As a result of the Wannamaker decision,

in which State Farm had made a very thorough written, but not oral,
offer of coverage, insurers feared that no written offering would ever be
immune from attack in the courts. 37 Dewart helps to allay these fears
by providing insurers with some guidance regarding their duty under

32. 296 S.C. 150, 370 S.E.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1988).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (formerly S.C. CODE ANN. § 569-831 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988)).
34. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court has construed this statute to mean that
"underinsured motorists coverage in any amount up to the insured's liability coverage
must be offered to a policyholder." Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 154, 311
S.E.2d 723, 726 (1984) (emphasis added). "[Tihe burden is on the insurer to effectively
transmit the offer to the insured." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 291
S.C. 518, 521, 354 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1987). "[T]he statute mandates the insured be provided with adequate information, and in such a manner, as to allow the insured to make
an intelligent decision of whether to accept or reject the coverage." Id. If an insurance
carrier fails to make a "meaningful" offer to a policyholder, the policy will be reformed
by operation of law to include the coverage up to the limits of liability insurance carried
by the insured. Id. at 522, 354 S.E.2d at 557.
35. 291 S.C. 518, 354 S.E.2d 555 (1987).
36. The Wannamaker court adopted the test formulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1982). The test
imposes the following requirements:
(1) the insurer's notification process must be commercially reasonable, whether
oral or in writing; (2) the insurer must specify the limits of optional coverage
and not merely offer additional coverage in general terms; (3) the insurer must
intelligibly advise the insured of the nature of the optional coverage; and (4)
the insured must be told that optional coverages are available for an additional
premium.
Wannamaker, 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
37. B. MAYBANK, L. BOGGS, R. SHAW, K. SUGGS, & J. GRAY, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA VI-11 (1988).
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the statute. Dewart leaves unresolved, however, the question of what
insurers must do to satisfy a major part of the Wannamaker test.
The case arose when Angela Dewart, after suffering extensive injuries in an automobile accident, sought to reform her automobile insurance policy to include underinsured motorist coverage as a remedy for
the company's alleged failure to comply with its duty under former
South Carolina Code section 56-9-831. 38 The issue presented on appeal
was whether a premium renewal notice accompanied by a separate,
one-page insert satisfied the Wannamaker test (i.e., whether State
Farm complied with its statutory duty to make a meaningful offer of
underinsured motorist coverage to Dewart).
The court concluded the premium renewal notice contained no explanation of underinsured motorist coverage.39 Furthermore, the court
stated that the notice did "not even use the words 'underinsured motorist' or 'underinsured motor vehicle.' "4o Although the notice did refer to "coverage W," to obtain an explanation of what "coverage W"
was, the insured was required to read the separate insert.' Nothing
printed on the notice, however, directed the insured to read this information in the insert.

38. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988). Current South Carolina Code section 38-77-160 corresponds to former section 56-9-831. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
39. Dewart, 296 S.C. at 150, 370 S.E.2d at 917.
40. Id.

41. The insert contained a brief paragraph under a heading which read: "About
Coverage W, Underinsured Motor Vehicle." The paragraph read:
Coverage W, Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, protects you and your
passengers for bodily injury and property damage caused by an underinsured

motor vehicle. If the damages for which the at-fault other driver is legally liable to you and your passengers exceed the other driver's liability limits or self
insurance, Coverage W can apply up to the limits you choose. (See "Available
Limits" on the reverse side.)

Record at 55.
Under the heading "Available Limits" were two paragraphs which provided:
You may purchase Coverage U and Coverage W with limits up to your

bodily injury and property damage liability (Coverage A) limits. The basic limits for both Coverages U and W are $15,000/$30,000/$5,000.
If you're interested in raising Coverage U or Coverage W limits or adding
Coverage W, please refer to your enclosed Premium Notice.
Record at 56.
The premium renewal notice read:
If you want coverage U and coverage W limits equal to your present liability limits of $25,000/$50,000/$25,000 pay $97.80
If you want coverage W limits equal to your present coverage U limits of
$15,000/$30,000/$5,000 pay $93.00
If you wish to keep your present limits, pay the amount due [$89.00].
Record at 57.
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The court held that the notice failed the Wannamaker test, and,
therefore, that State Farm failed to make a meaningful offer of underinsured motorist coverage to Dewart.42 The court determined that
while the notice satisfied the first, second, and fourth prongs of the
test, it failed to satisfy the third prong.4 3 The court stated:
Placing critical information in two documents, without directing the
insured to read both, was not a method reasonably calculated to draw
the insured's attention to the nature of the offer. On the contrary, by
splitting the information into separate documents without alerting the
insured, State Farm conveyed the offer in a manner likely to keep the
insured from finding an important explanation needed to understand
it and to make an informed
decision. This alone was sufficient to fail
44
the Wannamaker test.

Noting that State Farm had failed to follow one of its own internal
policy guides, which indicated that a premium renewal notice should
contain a renewal message stating, "SEE INSERT REGARDING UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE, COVERAGE W
.. " the court stated that "it was incumbent upon the company, as
its own internal policy recognized, to include something on the renewal
notice alerting the insured to read the insert. '45 Had State Farm done
so, the format in which the information on underinsured motorist coverage was conveyed to the insured apparently would have satisfied the
third prong of the Wannamaker test.
Because the court held that "[t]he format State Farm used .. .
was not reasonably calculated to draw attention to the explanation of
underinsured motorist coverage, '48 it did not reach the question of
"whether the language in the insert provided a complete and readily
' The
understandable explanation of the optional coverage."47
language
contained under the heading "About Coverage W, Underinsured Motor
Vehicle" was the same as the language the supreme court in Wan42. Dewart, 296 S.C. at 155, 370 S.E.2d at 918.
43. See id. at 154-55, 370 S.E.2d at 917-918. The court interpreted the third prong
of the test as follows:
[The third prong of the Wannamaker test] requires the insurer to
give an intelligible explanation of underinsured motorist coverage in such a
manner that the insured can make an informed decision to accept or reject the
additional coverage. This means that the necessary information must be conveyed in a format and in language that make it readily understandable to a
person of common intelligence.
Id. at 154, 370 S.E.2d at 917. See also supra note 36 (listing the four prongs of the
Wannamaker test).
44. Dewart, 296 S.C. at 155, 370 S.E.2d at 918.
45. Id. at 154-55, 370 S.E.2d at 917-18.
46. Id. at 154, 370 S.E.2d at 917.
47. Id. at 155, 370 S.E.2d at 918.
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namaker held did not constitute a meaningful offer of underinsured
motorist coverage. However, because the supreme court in Wan-

namaker did not state how that offering, which differed from the offering in Dewart in ways other than the language explaining underinsured
motorist coverage, failed to meet the requirements of the four-part
test, it is unclear whether the Dewart language satisfies the test.
Thus, while Dewart provides insurers with guidance as to what
will satisfy the first, second, and fourth prongs of the Wannamaker
test, Dewart is of little help as to what will satisfy the third prong.
Consequently, although Dewart sheds some light on what insurers
must do to comply with their duty under South Carolina Code section
38-77-160, the decision lends no guidance as to the language necessary
to effectively advise insureds with regard to optional underinsured motorist coverage.
John Michael Campbell

III.

UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES HELD
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE; CLASS Two INSUREDS PRECLUDED FROM
STACKING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES

In Fireman'sInsurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.48 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that underinsured and uninsured motorist coverages are mutually exclusive.49 The

court also addressed whether Class II insureds may stack uninsured
motorist benefits. The court held that when no vehicles belonging to
the insured are involved in the accident, the insured can collect uninsured motorist coverage under only one of his automobile policies providing such coverage."0 Also, policy provisions govern when a party is
not a statutory insured and a provision that prohibits stacking is enforceable against a nonstatutory "contractual" insured." Finally, the
court permitted both a Class II insured and a nonstatutory insured to
stack medical52 payments coverages when the policy contained a separability clause.

This case presented a complex fact situation. An automobile
driven by Mullins and owned by Locklear, who was a passenger at the
time of the accident, was involved in a collision with a Florida resident,
Gentry. Gentry, the at-fault driver, had liability coverage sufficient to

48. 295 S.C. 538, 370 S.E.2d 85 (1988).
49. Id. at 543, 370 S.E.2d at 88.
50. Id. at 545.46, 370 S.E.2d at 89.
51. Id. at 547, 370 S.E.2d at 90.
52. Id.
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If.. .an insured... is protected by uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage in excess of the basic limits, the policy shall provide
that the insured is protected only to the extent of coverage he has on
the vehicle involved in the accident. If none of the insured's or named
insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available
only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with excess
or underinsuredcoverage. Coverage on any other vehicle shall not be
added to that coverage.7
Fireman's argued that Mullins' rights were controlled by the second
sentence as interpreted in Garris v. CincinnatiInsurance Co.' s In Garris, the court held that section 56-9-831 precluded Class II insureds
from stacking underinsured motorist coverages, since none of the insured's vehicles were involved in the accident. 9 Fireman's asserted
that "the effect of Garris is that when an insured is not riding in his
own vehicle, uninsured or underinsured coverage may not be
7' 0
stacked.
Mullins contended that section 56-9-831 prohibited stacking by a
Class II insured only in excess of the basic limits. The trial judge
adopted this view stating, "'I do not interpret the intent of the legislature here to prohibit stacking of all uninsured coverages. I interpret
the word "excess" to mean excess uninsured coverage, not all uninsured coverage.' "71 The lower court thus concluded that Mullins could
stack uninsured coverages up to the statutorily required minimum limits. The court stated that Garris dealt only with the issue of stacking
underinsured motorist coverage, which is optional coverage, and thus
that the two cases were sufficiently distinguishable.7 2 The supreme
court rejected the lower court's reasoning and ruled that a Class II insured is precluded from stacking uninsured and underinsured coverages.7 3 "Accordingly, Mullins [was not permitted to] stack uninsured
benefits as a Class II insured; and because [his was] an excess policy,
he [was] only entitled to $35,000 uninsured coverage as set forth in the
7' 4
policy.
The court then turned to Locklear's rights under the Mullins pol-

67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988) (emphasis
added). Current South Carolina Code section 38-77-160 corresponds to former section
56-9-831. The new section is identical to the earlier version except that the last sentence
has been omitted. This does not appear to be a significant change. See S.C. CODE ANN. §
38-77-160 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
68. 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984).
69. Id. at 156, 311 S.E.2d at 727.
70. Brief of Appellant at 10 (emphasis added).
71. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 545, 370 S.E.2d at 89 (quoting Record at 24).
72. Record at 24.
73. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 546, 370 S.E.2d at 89.
74. Id.
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icy. The trial judge had classified Locklear as a Class I insured for purposes of stacking.7 5 The supreme court rejected this conclusion, holding
that while Locklear was a Class I insured under her policy with State
Farm, that classification did not carry over to the Mullins policy.
Locklear did not qualify as a Class I or Class II insured under the statutory definitions, 76 but instead was classified as a "contractual" insured.77 Since there was no statutorily required coverage, the policy
terms, which prohibited stacking, governed Locklear's rights. As a result, Mullins
and Locklear were required to share the single $35,000
78
recovery.
The court rejected Fireman's reading of the policy to the extent it
would have precluded Mullins and Locklear from stacking medical
payments coverages. 7 1 Relying on Kraft v. Hartford Insurance Co.,80
the court ruled that the separability clause treated each vehicle as if
insured under a separate policy.81 Therefore, both Mullins and
Locklear were entitled to stack medical payments coverages.
Fireman's was decided under the law in effect prior to January 1,
1988. The new title 38, which became effective January 1, 1988, clearly
provides that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are mutually exclusive.8 2 The supreme court reached the same conclusion by
interpreting the earlier statutes. Although it would not have affected
the outcome of Fireman's, it is important to consider what effect the
new statutory definition of underinsured may have on future cases. In
this case and in others, s3 the court has ruled that underinsured coverage applies when the insured's damages exceed the liability limits of
the at-fault driver. This definition is clearly in conflict with the new
restrictive statutory definition.8 4 The issue is further confused by new

75. Record at 56.
76. Fireman's,295 S.C. at 547, 370 S.E.2d at 90; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(6)
(Law. Co-op. 1989).
77. See Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 547, 370 S.E.2d at 90.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 548, 370 S.E.2d at 90.
80. 279 S.C. 257, 305 S.E.2d 243 (1983).
81. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 548, 370 S.E.2d at 90.
82. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(14) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
83. See, e.g., Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983);
Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984).
84. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-7-30(14) (Law. Co-op. 1989). The new definition reads
as follows:
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as to which there is bodily injury liabilityinsurance or a bond applicable to the time of the accident in
an amount of at least that specified in Section 38-77-140 and the amount of
the insurance or bond:
(a) is less than the limit for underinsured motorist coverage under the insured's policy; or
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South Carolina Code section 38-73-1105," which requires insurers to
make rate and form filings with the Insurance Commissioner before
relying on the statutory definition. 86 The effects of these changes on
future cases are uncertain at this time.
The new rule that emerges from Fireman's is that "Class II insureds . . . may not stack even basic limits policies; stated another

way, if none of the insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, the
insured can collect [uninsured]. . . benefits for only one of his insured
vehicles."8 Because of the unusual fact situation and the recent
changes in statutory law, it is impossible to predict what the future
impact of this decision will be. The most practical way to derive any
specific guidelines from this case is to read it in conjunction with earlier cases cited by the court. Several important factors will be considered by courts analyzing a stacking issue: the number of coverages contracted and paid for; whether there is policy language dealing with
stacking; whether there are statutorily required coverages that are not
included in the policy; and whether there are statutes that prohibit or
limit stacking.8
When read in conjunction with the new statutory definition of underinsured, this case seems to indicate a shift away from the previous
policy of construing ambiguous insurance terms strictly in favor of the
insured. The shift, however, can be expected initially to cause considerable confusion in cases presenting issues similar to those in Fireman's.
As stated by Chief Justice Ness in his dissent, "Unusual facts should
logically create unusual results. Unfortunately, unusual facts often create inconsistent
reasoning and more importantly, conflicting case
89
law."
Janet Laws Carter

() has been reduced by payments to persons, other than an insured, injured in
the accident to an amount less than the limit for underinsured motorist coverage under the insured's policy.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-73-1105 (Law. Co-op. 1989).

86. See id.
87. See B. MAYBANK, HI, L. BOGGs, R. SHAW, K. SUGGs & J. GRAY, J.,supra note 37,
at X-11 (1988).
88. See id. at X-13.
89. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 556, 370 S.E.2d at 95 (Ness, C.J., dissenting).
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IV.

LIABILITY INSURANCE HELD NOT APPLICABLE WHEN DRIVER OF
RENTAL CAR NOT LISTED ON RENTAL APPLICATION

0 the South Carolina
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Edwards"
Supreme Court held that a car rental agency is not responsible for liability insurance for drivers not listed on the rental application. 9 1 The
case arose after Lisa Edwards and her mother went to the office of
Holiday Rent a Car to rent an automobile. The paperwork for the
rental was completed by the agency's employee through information
provided by the mother. The employee presented the agreement to the

mother for her signature. Contained in the agreement was a box in

which to list persons, other than the renter, who would drive the vehithe agreement stated that only named drivers
cle. Below this box
92
would be insured.

The mother did not list Edwards as an additional driver. On the
back of the agreement was a warning that only persons named in the
agreement may drive the vehicle. When Edwards' mother signed the
agreement she indicated she had read and agreed to the terms and
conditions on both sides of the contract. Soon after leaving the rental
agency, Edwards, who was driving the rental car, collided with another
vehicle. She and two others were injured and the mother was killed.
The car rental agency and its insurer brought a declaratory judgment
whether the agency's liability coverage applied to
action to determine
3
the accident.

While South Carolina courts have addressed the issue of whether
coverage is provided when the named insured expressly prohibits a
permittee from allowing a third party to drive a vehicle,9 4 this is the
first case addressing the issue as it pertains to the rental car business.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency and
its insurer and Edwards appealed. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision, relying on a history of cases holding that a third party
driver is not a permissive user and, therefore, is not covered under the
named insured's policy when the named insured expressly prohibits
the permittee from allowing a third party to operate the vehicle.9

90. 294 S.C. 368, 364 S.E.2d 750 (1988).
91. Id. at 371, 364 S.E.2d at 751.
92. Id. at 370, 364 S.E.2d at 751.
93. Id. at 369-70, 364 S.E.2d at 750-51.
94. See Keeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 151, 198 S.E.2d 793 (1973); Southern
Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 255 S.C. 427, 179
S.E.2d 454 (1971); Dearybury v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 398, 179 S.E.2d 206
(1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 392, 179 S.E.2d 203

(1971).
95. See Edwards, 294 S.C. at 370, 364 S.E.2d at 751.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss1/10

12

et al.:REVIEW
Insurance Law
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

[Vol. 41

tive definition of underinsured coverage contained in the policy61 and
ruled that underinsured coverage applied whenever the damages sustained were greater than the liability insurance carried by the at-fault
driver.62 The court stated that "optional underinsured coverage would
always be over and above either the at fault [sic] driver's liability coverage or over and above the policyholder's own uninsured motorist
'63
coverage.

The court in Fireman'srejected the lower court's reliance on Gambrell and instead relied on South Carolina Code section 56-9-831." The
statute was interpreted as providing for the following two separate contingencies: (1) uninsured coverage applies when the at-fault driver
lacks the minimum basic limits required under South Carolina law;
and (2) underinsured coverage applies only when the statutory requirements are met and the liability limits of the at-fault driver are less
than the damages sustained.6 5 Under this interpretation the two coverages were mutually exclusive and Gentry, the at-fault driver, was unin66
sured under South Carolina law.

The court next addressed whether Mulins was entitled to stack
uninsured benefits. The court ruled that Mullins was a Class II insured
since none of his vehicles were involved in the accident. A dispute
arose regarding the interpretation of a portion of section 56-9-831,
which provided:

61. The policy at issue in Gambrell defined underinsured motor vehicle as "'[a]
motor vehicle with respect to the ownership [sic] maintenance or use of which the sum of
the limit of liability under all bodily injury or property damage liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits
under this insurance. . ..'" Id. at 72 n.1, 310 S.E.2d at 817 n.1 (quoting the Travelers
Insurance policy issued to Gambrell). In other words, underinsured coverage would apply
only when the amount of underinsured coverage was greater than the at-fault driver's
liability coverage. Although the court rejected this definition in Gambrell, it should be
noted that this is very similar to the new definition of underinsured found in South
Carolina Code section 38-77-30(14). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(14) (Law. Co-op.
1989).
62. Gambrell, 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 816.

63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 542, 370 S.E.2d at 87 (relying on S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-9-831 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988)). Current South Carolina Code section 38-77-160 corresponds to former section 56-9-831. See S.C. COD. ANN. § 38-77-160
(Law. Co-op. 1989).
65. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 543, 370 S.E.2d at 88.
66. Discussion regarding whether an automobile "is or is not uninsured or underinsured is now rendered moot by the Legislature's Amendment of § 56-9-810 [repealed
1988] which now includes a definition of an [uninsured and] underinsured motorist vehicle." Id. at 549 n.1, 370 S.E.2d at 91 n.1 (Ness, C.J., dissenting). Current South Carolina
Code section 38-77-30 corresponds to former section 56-9-810. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 3877-160 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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satisfy the Florida requirements of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per
occurrence.5 3 This coverage, however, was insufficient under South Carolina law, which prescribes minimum limits of $15,000 per person and
$30,000 per occurrence.5"
Mullins had a single limit policy"5 with Fireman's Fund Insurance
(Fireman's), which provided for $35,000 coverage per accident. 6 Mullins had three vehicles insured under the policy. 7 Fireman's brought a

declaratory judgment action to determine what amounts of coverage
were available to Mullins and Locklear under the policy issued to

Mullins.
The case was submitted to a judge without a jury on stipulated

facts. The lower court ruled that Mullins was entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverages in the amount of $45,000 ($15,000 per vehi-

cle). The court also found Mullins entitled to collect underinsured coverage in the amount of $35,000. Locklear was permitted to stack both

uninsured 'and underinsured motorist coverages5

8

Both Mullins and

Locklear were permitted to stack medical payments coverages.5 9 Fireman's appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The court first addressed whether uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverages are mutually exclusive. Examining the differences
between the two coverages, the lower court had relied on Gambrell v.
Travelers Insurance Cos. 6 0 In Gambrell, the court rejected the restric-

53. Id. at 540, 370 S.E.2d at 86.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988). The current
statute prescribing minimum limits for automobile insurance is South Carolina Code section 38-77-140. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
55. A single limit insurance policy has been described as follows:
A 'single limit' insurance policy is one in which the insurance company provides a specified amount of insurance for each accident regardless of the number of persons injured. Under this coverage one person may recover up to the
single limit specified in the policy. The 'single limit' policy should be contrasted with the more typical 'split limit' policy, which provides a certain
amount of insurance for each individual who may be injured and another
amount for each accident regardless of how many are injured.
Stacking of Insurance Coverages,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 37 S.CL. REV.
157, 158 n.103 (1985) (citations omitted).
56. Fireman's, 295 S.C. at 540, 370 S.E.2d at 86.
57. Id. Locklear had liability and uninsured motorist coverages with State Farm
which provided a $30,000 limit per accident. State Farm paid the $30,000 limit and was
not a party to this action.
58. Id. The trial court determined that Locklear was entitled to $45,000 ($15,000
per vehicle) in uninsured coverage and $45,000 ($15,000 per vehicle) in underinsured
motorist coverage.
59. Id. Mullins and Locklear were each found entitled to medical payments coverages of $9,000 per person ($3,000 per vehicle).
60. 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
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The supreme court expressed its reasoning as follows: "[The rental
agency gave the mother] permission to use its covered vehicle with the
express prohibition in the rental agreement that no unnamed driver
operate it. [The mother] therefore did not have authority to delegate
permission to Edwards who was not named on the rental agreement."96
Furthermore, the court refused to find that the rental company had
impliedly granted Edwards permission to use the car, because there
was no evidence the "[i]nsured had actual knowledge that Edwards
9' 7
would drive the vehicle.

The court noted its agreement with the appellant's argument that
a car rental agency should have an affirmative duty to bring to the
renter's attention a limitation on permissive use of a rented vehicle.
The court felt, however, that the issue was a matter of public policy for
the legislature to address.9 8
The cases on which the court relied are distinguishable from the
facts in Edwards. In Keeler v. Allstate Insurance Co.9 9 a minor purchased a car, which was titled and insured in the father's name. The
father warned the son about allowing others to drive the car and specifically told the son that a particular friend could not drive the car.
Ignoring his father's instructions, the son let the friend drive the car
and an accident resulted. The court found the friend was not a permissive user of the named insured (the father) and coverage was denied. 100
Unlike Keeler, and other cases cited by the court,10 ' the Edwards
opinion did not address whether the mother actually knew that her
daughter would not be covered under the policy. Since the argument
raised on appeal was that there should be an affirmative duty to bring
to the renter's attention the limitation on permissive use, there may
have been an indication that the mother was not aware her daughter
would not be insured. Certainly, a reasonable person would not allow
another to drive a car when she knows the other would not be covered
by insurance. If Edwards' mother was not aware that she was the only
insured driver, the persuasiveness of the above cases substantially di-

96. Id. at 370-71, 364 S.E.2d at 751.
97. Id. at 371, 364 S.E.2d at 751. The court cited Holloman v. McAllister, 289 S.C.
183, 345 S.E.2d 728 (1986), for the proposition that permission will be implied when an
owner has actual knowledge of a driver's intent to use his vehicle, yet does nothing to
prevent the use.
98. See Edwards, 294 S.C. at 371, 364 S.E.2d at 751.
99. 261 S.C. 151, 198 S.E.2d 793 (1973).
100. Id. at 156, 198 S.E.2d at 796.
101. See Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 255 S.C. 427, 179 S.E.2d 454 (1971); Dearybury v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 255 S.C.
398, 179 S.E.2d 206 (1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 S.C.
392, 179 S.E.2d 203 (1971).
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minishes, since those cases involved permittees who were unquestionably aware that others were not allowed to drive the vehicle.
Relying on Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 10 2 the Edwards court declined to

distinguish between the "use" of a vehicle and the "operation" of a
vehicle. Some jurisdictions have held that "use" and not "operation" of
the vehicle is the proper standard by which to determine the applicability of liability insurance. These jurisdictions have reasoned that as
long as the renter is a passenger in the vehicle, he is still "using" the
vehicle within the scope of permission from the rental agency. 103 Other
jurisdictions have reached opposite conclusions, focusing on the express prohibition contained in rental agreements against allowing unnamed persons to drive the vehicles.' 0 ' South Carolina opted to follow
the stricter rule, which essentially makes third party drivers persons
driving without the permission of the named insured.
The Edwards opinion states that "Edwards was not involved in
the rental transaction and merely wandered about the lobby while her
mother discussed the car rental with [the rental agency's employee]." 05 Thus, Edwards presumably had no knowledge that she was
not insured when she drove her mother's rental car. She drove the vehicle with her mother's permission and for her mother's benefit as well.
The court is correct in deciding that the legislature is the appropriate body to address the public policy issue concerning a rental
agency's duty to bring to the renter's attention the limitation on permissive use. Nonetheless, its holding in Edwards often will lead to inequitable results which the court could have avoided. The better rule
would have been one which states that when a renter is a passenger in
a rented car that is being used for his benefit, the driver is covered
under such limited circumstances. Thus, the court should reassess its
definition of "use" in the rental car context, and broaden the term to
include instances in which the renter is a passenger in the vehicle.
0. Carlisle Edwards, Jr.

102. 255 S.C. 427, 179 S.E.2d 454 (1971).
103. See, e.g., Buntin v. Continental Ins. Co., 583 F.2d 1201, 1205 (3d Cir. 1978)
(applying the common law as applicable in the U.S. Virgin Islands); Great Am. Ins. Co.
v. Anderson, 395 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Tennessee law); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1955) (applying Maryland law); Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100, 104-05, 416 P.2d 801, 804-05, 52 Cal. Rptr.
569, 572-73 (1966); Grady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1978);
Weathers v. Royal Indem. Co., 577 S.W.2d 623, 627-28 (Mo. 1979); Persellin v. State
Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 75 N.D. 716, 720-21, 32 N.W.2d 644, 646 (1948).
104. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mueller, 432 F. Supp. 325, 328 (W.D. Va.
1977), af/'d, 570 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1978).
105. Edwards, 294 S.C. at 370, 364 S.E.2d at 751.
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COURT ESTABLISHES ELEMENTS INSURERS MUST SHOW WHEN

RELYING ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ARSON DEFENSE

In Carter v. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co.10 8 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the issue of what elements are
necessary to prove civil arson when relying on circumstantial evidence.
Affirming the trial court's decision, the court held that an arson defense based solely on circumstantial evidence can prevail if the insurer
proves the fire was incendiary in nature and the insured had both opportunity and motive to set the fire.1""
On November 10, 1980, a fire occurred at the home of the appellant, Richard E. Carter. Carter had left his home early that evening to
help an employee who was having car trouble. A short time later Mrs.
Carter and her daughter also left the house. Carter returned home at
approximately 9:30 p.m. with his employee. Carter loaned his car to
the employee, so Carter's wife picked him up and they drove to a
friend's house. At approximately 12:30 p.m. the Carters returned home.
A fire had been discovered at 11:00 p.m.10 8
For some time prior to the fire Carter had been experiencing financial difficulties. There were two mortgages on the house, which had
been listed for sale for over one year. In addition, federal and state tax
liens had been filed against Carter and he was having difficulty paying
his credit card accounts. 0 9
The respondent, American Mutual Fire Insurance Company, refused to pay Carter's insurance claim. As a result, Carter brought suit
against the company, alleging breach of contract and bad faith refusal
to pay insurance benefits under a fire insurance policy. The jury returned a verdict for American Mutual. After denial of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Carter appealed. The court of
appeals found there was sufficient evidence of the fire's incendiary origin, motive, and opportunity to warrant submission to the jury and to
support the jury's verdict in favor of American Mutual.110 Therefore, it
affirmed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict."1
In its analysis the court of appeals relied on a Georgia Court of
Appeals decision, Fortson v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.1 2 In

Fortson,as in Carter,an insured alleged a claim of bad faith refusal to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

297 S.C. 218, 375 S.E.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 220, 375 S.E.2d at 358.
Id., 375 S.E.2d at 357.
Id.
Id. at 220, 375 S.E.2d at 358.
Id.
168 Ga. App. 155, 308 S.E.2d 382 (1983).
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pay benefits under a policy. The insurance company asserted arson as
its defense. The evidence showed that prior to the fire the insured had
experienced financial difficulties*, which evidence the insured failed to
repudiate. Additional circumstantial evidence in the form of expert
testimony supported the insurance company's contention that the fire
was incendiary. The insurance company moved for a directed verdict,
but the trial court denied the motion. 113 The Georgia Court of Appeals,
however, held that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion
for a directed verdict because the insurance company had proved a
reasonable defense of arson as a matter of law. 4 The Fortson court
held that "[a]n insurance company can prevail in an arson defense
based solely on circumstantial evidence if it shows that the fire was of
incendiary origin and that the plaintiff had both the opportunity and
'15
motive to have the fire set."
A majority of jurisdictions similarly hold that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove arson as a defense. 6 The South Carolina
Court of Appeals, by adopting the Fortson holding, aligned this state
with the majority view as to the elements necessary to support an arson defense based on circumstantial evidence." 7 The case established
clear and definite authority in South Carolina that an insurer's arson
defense may prevail, even if it is supported only by circumstantial evidence. Thus, after Carter,if an insurer proves through circumstantial
evidence that a fire was incendiary and that the insured had both op-

113. See id. at 156, 308 S.E.2d at 383-84.
114. Id. at 158, 308 S.E.2d at 385.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Quast v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 267 N.W.2d 493 (Minn.
1978) (circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support jury's verdict and permit arson
defense to prevail); Shawanga Holding Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 57 A.D.2d 677, 394 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1977) (since direct proof of arson is seldom available, it can be established in civil cases by circumstantial evidence); Yassoo Enters. v.
North Carolina Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 73 N.C. App. 52, 325 S.E.2d 677 (1985) (circumstantial evidence found sufficient to support jury's verdict in favor of an insurance
company asserting arson as a defense).
117. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (11th Cir. 1983)
(prima facie case of arson may be established when motive, opportunity, and incendiary
origin are shown by circumstantial evidence); Lawson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins.
Co., 41 Colo. App. 362, 585 P.2d 318 (1978) (prima facie case established when party
shows incendiary origin, motive, and circumstantial evidence indicating arson); Souper
Spud, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 5 Conn. App. 579, 501 A.2d 1214 (1985) (incendiary origin, opportunity, and motive may be proven by circumstantial evidence to support arson defense); Qust v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 267 N.W.2d 493
(Minn. 1978) (circumstantial evidence of incendiary origin, motive, and opportunity was
sufficient to support jury's verdict in favor of the insurer); Zajac v. Great Am. Ins. Cos.,
410 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1987) (incendiary fire and evidence of motive sufficient to support
jury verdict).
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portunity and motive to set it, the insurer's defense can be expected to
succeed.
Valerie L. Brumfield

VI.

CERTAIN BYSTANDERS MAY RECOVER UNDER TORTFEASOR'S

LL4BIrTY INSURANCE FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
TRAUMA

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ramsey,11 8
the South Carolina Court of Appeals determined the applicability of a
standard insurance policy to negligent infliction of emotional trauma.
The case presented a novel question in South Carolina which was resolved when the court held negligent infliction of emotional trauma is a
bodily injury for which damages may be recovered under a standard
policy of insurance."" 9 The decision is a logical extension of existing
South Carolina case law.
The case arose when Candus Ramsey witnessed the insured fatally
strike her daughter, Deana Ramsey, with the insured's automobile.
The State Farm policy provided coverage for the insured's automobile
of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. State Farm admitted
liability and paid $25,000 for the daughter's death. Ms. Ramsey then
sought damages for emotional trauma as bodily injury under the policy. The circuit court held that "emotional trauma is bodily injury for
which damages may be assessed under a standard automobile liability
insurance policy.
1 21
affirmed.

'12

State Farm appealed and the court of appeals

The court first addressed South Carolina case law which establishes that emotional trauma is bodily injury.' 22 It noted that in this
state, emotional tranquility is deemed worthy of legal protection and,
therefore, that our courts permit recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.123 South Carolina also allows compensation for
mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, and grief and sorrow in
wrongful death actions."4 The court of appeals finally noted that in

118. 295 S.C. 349, 368 S.E.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1988).
119. Id. at 351, 368 S.E.2d at 478.
120. Id. at 350, 368 S.E.2d at 478.
121. Id., 368 S.E.2d at 477-78.
122. See id., 368 S.E.2d at 478 (citing Spaugh v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 158 S.C.
25, 155 S.E. 145 (1930)).
123. Id. (citing Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981)).
124. Id. (citing Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97
(1938)).
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Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co. 12 5 the South Carolina Supreme

Court recognized a cause of action for emotional distress to certain by12 6
standers who meet established criteria.
The court in Ramsey next addressed the pertinent part of the
State Farm policy. The relevant sections provided that the insurer
would pay when an insured became legally liable for damages resulting
from bodily injury to others caused by an accident. 127 With little discussion regarding the basis for its reasoning, the court held that negligent infliction of emotional trauma is a bodily injury for which damages may be recovered under the standard policy of insurance.' 2 The
court stated, however, that the elements under Kinard would have to
29
be met in order to recover.1

The concurring opinion offered-more insight into the court's sparse
reasoning by focusing on the extent of coverage. Furthermore, it explained the logical adoption of the California court's reasoning. 30
As noted, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Kinard followed
California by adopting a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional trauma to bystanders. 31 Since then, the California Court of Appeal decided Employers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Foust,'31 which interpreted the coverage of negligent infliction of emotional trauma in a
liability insurance policy. The California court determined the words
"bodily injury" as used in the policy included physical injury caused by
emotional trauma, and that coverage was not limited to the "one person" liability limit. 133 The holding in Ramsey mirrors that of the Cali-

fornia court and South Carolina appropriately looked to that state for
guidance. Thus, following the reasoning of Foust, an insured in South
Carolina may recover the maximum "per occurrence" coverage for negligent infliction of emotional distress. This decision is a logical extension of South Carolina law.
Other jurisdictions that have adopted a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress to bystanders inevitably will face
the issue presented in Ramsey. If a state determines that bodily injury

125. 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985). In Kinard the court followed the rationale
of the California Supreme Court in the landmark decision, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See Ramsey, 295 S.C. at 350-51, 368 S.E.2d at 478.
126. Ramsey, 295 S.C. at 350-51, 368 S.E.2d at 478.
127. Id. at 351, 368 S.E.2d at 478.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 352-54, 368 S.E.2d at 478-80 (Cureton, J., concurring).
131. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
132. 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
133. See Ramsey, 295 S.C. at 354, 368 S.E.2d at 480 (Cureton, J., concurring) (citing
Foust, 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505).
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encompasses emotional distress, as jurisdictions clearly are becoming
more willing to do,' insurance companies likely will be required to
pay damages to emotionally injured bystanders. If a jurisdiction has
not determined whether emotional distress is a bodily injury, insurance
companies will attempt to deny coverage. Even when "bodily injury" is
defined in the insurance policy, if it is not perfectly clear, courts may
construe the definition against the insurer.
In Wolfe v. State Farm Insurance Co.,13 5 the only other case ad-

dressing this issue, a New Jersey court interpreted the same State
Farm policy and held the insurer was liable. Thus, South Carolina apparently is in line with the current trend in such cases. For jurisdictions that have not yet had to determine the existence of the cause of
action, however, the determinative factors will be the state's common
law and how strictly the state's courts tend to construe insurance
policies.
The court in Ramsey determined that negligent infliction of emotional trauma is a bodily injury for which damages may be recovered
under a standard policy of insurance. Although the basis for the court's
reasoning is less than fully developed, the decision is a good one that
will enable qualified bystanders who suffer emotional trauma to be
compensated when insurance is available.
Kristen English Robinson

134. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Apache Ready Mix
Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
135. 224 N.J. Super. 348, 540 A.2d 871 (App. Div. 1988) (basing its decision upon
the meaning of "bodily injury" and its rule of construction for insurance policies).
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